Decision-Theoretic Troubleshooting: A Framework for Repair and
  Experiment by Breese, John S. & Heckerman, David
Decision-Theoretic Troubleshooting: A Framework for Repair and
Experiment
John S. Breese David Heckerman
Microsoft Research
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052-6399
{breese,heckerma}@microsoft.com
Abstract
We develop and extend existing decision-
theoretic methods for troubleshooting a non-
functioning device. Traditionally, diagnosis
with Bayesian networks has focused on be-
lief updating—determining the probabilities
of various faults given current observations.
In this paper, we extend this paradigm to
include taking actions. In particular, we con-
sider three classes of actions: (1) we can make
observations regarding the behavior of a de-
vice and infer likely faults as in traditional
diagnosis, (2) we can repair a component and
then observe the behavior of the device to in-
fer likely faults, and (3) we can change the
configuration of the device, observe its new
behavior, and infer the likelihood of faults.
Analysis of latter two classes of troubleshoot-
ing actions requires incorporating notions of
persistence into the belief-network formalism
used for probabilistic inference.
1 Introduction
Given that a device is not working properly or a pa-
tient has some complaint, automated-diagnostic sys-
tems have traditionally been been designed to deter-
mine the set of faults or diseases that explain the symp-
toms [de Kleer and Williams, 1987, Genesereth, 1984,
Heckerman et al., 1992, Breese et al., 1992]. The di-
agnostician is able to ask questions about the behav-
ior of the device or test individual components in or-
der to determine if they are working properly. As new
information is gained, the procedure updates its cur-
rent view of the world. Inference focuses on identify-
ing the set of faults consistent with the observations
and, in the probabilistic case, assigning probabilities
to the feasible diagnoses. Information gathering pro-
ceeds until a single cause has been identified or the
current diagnosis is sufficiently restricted to support
action.
From a decision making perspective, however, our pri-
mary objective is to repair the device or cure the pa-
tient, not just determine what is wrong. At any stage
of the process, there are many possible observations,
tests, or repairs that can be applied. Because these op-
erations are expensive in terms of time and/or money,
we wish to generate a sequence of actions that min-
imizes costs and results in a functioning device (or
healthy patient). In this paper, we develop a diag-
nostic procedure (i.e., planner) that selects the next
best action by estimating the expected cost of repair
for various plans. Because computation of the optimal
plan is intractable, we develop procedures for estimat-
ing the expected cost of repair for plans that
1. Repair system components in sequence (with no
observations) until the device is repaired
2. Gather evidence about the state of the system and
then repair components
3. Change the configuration of the system, observe
behavior, and then repair components
We use these cost estimates myopically to determine
the next troubleshooting step. After each action, prob-
abilities are updated and a new set of potential plans
are generated. This cycle continues until the device is
working properly.
From the perspective of belief-network diagnosis, the
second two classes of troubleshooting action are prob-
lematic. When we actively set (as opposed to passively
observe) the value of a variable in a Bayesian network,
previous observations regarding device behavior may
change. For example, in Figure 1 depicting a simplified
model of printing for personal computers, we may ini-
tially be unable to print over the network, but we are
able to print after we set the print logic to print locally.
There is no mechanism in a single static Bayesian net-
work to combine the observations before and after this
action. In this paper, we describe a notion called per-
sistence, and show how it can be used as a solution to
this problem in the context of troubleshooting.
2 Basic Troubleshooting
In this section, we describe a set of assumptions under
which it is possible to identify an optimal sequence of
observations and repair actions in time proportional
to the number of components in the device, with-
out explicitly constructing and rolling back a decision
tree. The approach is described in Heckerman et al.
(1995). Let us suppose that the device has n compo-
nents c1, . . . , cn and each component is in exactly one
of a finite set of states. We assume1
1. There is only one problem-defining variable in the
Bayesian network for the device. This variable
represents the functional status of the device. One
of the states of this variable must correspond to
normal operation. In Figure 1, the node labeled
“Printer Output” is the problem-defining node.
We will write e = normal to denote the event
that the problem defining node is normal.
2. At the onset of troubleshooting, the device is
faulty—that is the problem defining variable is
observed to be faulty.
3. Single fault: Exactly one component is abnor-
mal and is responsible for the failure of the de-
vice. We use pi to denote the probability that
repairing component ci will repair the device un-
der the current state of information I, that is
pi ≡ Pr(e = normal|repair(cI), I). Under the
single-fault assumption,
∑n
i=1 pi = 1.
4. Each component is observable or unobservable.
An observable component can be unambiguously
tested or inspected to determine correct opera-
tion. In this formulation, an observable compo-
nent that is observed to be abnormal is immedi-
ately repaired. An unobservable component can
never be directly observed, but can be repaired
or replaced. In Figure 1, the components “Ca-
ble Port Hardware”, “Network Connection”, and
“Driver File Status” are unobservable—one can
reinstall the driver file from disk, but it is ex-
tremely difficult to determine if the file is corrupt
directly. For convenience, we use observation–
repair action to refer both to the observation and
1The appropriateness of these assumptions is discussed
in Heckerman et al. (1995).
possible repair of an observable component and to
the repair of an unobservable component.
6. The costs of observation and repair of any com-
ponent do not depend on previous repair or ob-
servation actions.
7. Limited observations: No observations, other
than the observation-repair of a component, are
undertaken during the course of troubleshooting.
For the moment, let us consider only observable com-
ponents. Let Coi and C
r
i denote the cost of observation
and repair of component ci. If we observe and possibly
repair components in the order c1, . . . , cn, then for the
expected cost of repair under state of information I,
denoted ECR(I), we have
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That is, we first observe component c1 incurring cost
Co
1
. With probability p1, we find that the component is
faulty and repair it (and the device) incurring cost Cr
1
.
With probability 1−p1, we find that the component is
functioning properly, and observe component c2. With
probability p2/(1 − p1), we find that c2 is faulty and
repair it; and so on.
By reversing the order of the any two steps in the
repair sequence, one can show that the minimum ex-
pected cost sequence is obtained by ordering the com-
ponents according to a decreasing probability to cost
ratio. The expected cost of repair ECR(I) is under-
stood to be that under the component ordering where
p1
Co
1
≥
p2
Co
2
≥ . . . ≥
pn
Con
.
We sequentially repair or replace the components ac-
cording to the ordering of their pi/C
o
i ratios. After
each repair, we observe whether the device is working
properly, and if so, terminate.
Including unobservable components in this approach is
straightforward. Recall that an unobservable compo-
nent ci is simply repaired with cost C
r
i . Therefore, an
unobservable component acts just like an observable
component that is observed with cost Cri and always
found to be faulty and repaired with cost zero. Con-
sequently, we can include unobservable components in
Figure 1: A simplified Bayesian network for printing problems on personal computers.
our procedure, provided we set Coi to the cost of repair
of unobservable component ci, and set C
r
i to zero.
2
2.1 Computing Probabilities of Faulty
Components using Persistence
When troubleshooting under uncertainty, we need to
compute the probabilities that components have failed.
In our approach, we compute these probabilities using
a Bayesian network. Given the observation that “Print
Output” is false, we can use a Bayesian-network infer-
ence algorithm to compute the probability that any or
all of the system components are faulty. When we wish
to recalculate probabilities given a component of the
device has been repaired, updating procedures must
account for the change in underlying state of the de-
vice and the fact that previous observations may have
been invalidated.
Consider the simple causal relationship between the
status of a computer’s connection to the network
(“Net”), which we model as having states normal or
abnormal, and the appearance of the printer icon in
the print manager (“Icon”), which we model as having
2It is also straightforward to add the notion of a ser-
vice call, a fixed charge that will repair any fault with the
device. See Heckerman et al. (1995) for details.
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Figure 2: (a) A Bayesian network for the interaction
between net connections and print icon appearance.
(b) A persistence network for determining the proba-
bility that the print icon will appear normal after we
verify net connectivity, given that the icon is currently
greyed out.
states normal and grey. The two nodes are dependent
as depicted in the Bayesian network in Figure 2a.
Now suppose we observe the icon to be grey, and we
want to determine the probability that the icon will be
normal, after we make sure the network is connected.
We can do so, using the Bayesian network shown in
Figure 2b. In this network, “Netpre” and “Netpost”
represent whether or not the network is connected, re-
spectively before and after we establish connectivity .
Similarly, “Iconpre” and “Iconpost” represent whether
or not the icon is normal before and after we connect
the network, respectively . The node mIcon repre-
sents all of the possible mappings between “Net” and
“Icon”. Following Heckerman and Shachter (1995),
we call mIcon and its corresponding variable a map-
ping node and mapping variable, respectively. We call
the remaining nodes and their corresponding variables
domain nodes and domain variables, respectively.
As shown in Table 1, the mapping nodemIcon has four
possible states: (1) ok, where the icon is grey if and
only if there is no network, (2) stuck on grey, where
the icon is grey regardless of state of the network, (3)
stuck on normal, where the icon is always normal,
and (4) backwards, where the icon reads grey if and
only if the network is connected. The node “Iconpre” is
a deterministic function of its cause “Netpre” and the
node mIcon, as indicated by the double ovals around
the node “Iconpre”. For example, if “Netpre” is abnor-
mal and mIcon is backwards, then “Iconpre” will be
normal. The node “Iconpost” is the same determin-
istic function of cause “Netpost” and the node mIcon.
The uncertainty in the relationship between “Net” and
“Icon” is encoded in the probabilities for the node
mIcon. These probabilities are constrained by, but
not necessarily determined by, the probabilities in the
Bayesian network.
By using a single node mIcon to represent the map-
pings between “Network” and “Icon” both before and
after the action is taken, we encode the assertion that
the mapping (or mechanism) between cause and ef-
fect is not affected by actions that may change the
cause. Although we are uncertain about which map-
ping holds, representing this uncertainty in a single
node enforces the assertion that the mapping persists
across the action. We could equivalently have two
mapping nodes, one for before and one for after the
action, with an arc between the two. The state transi-
tion distribution for the mapping variables in this case
would encode the restriction that the state of the map-
ping variable after the action is the same as the state
before the action.
In order to calculate the probability that the icon will
be normal after establishing network connectivity, we
set “Netpost” to state normal and set “Iconpre” to state
grey in the network in Figure 2b. We then apply a
standard belief network inference algorithm to to the
network to calculate the probability that “Iconpost” =
normal.
We refer to this notion as causal persistence. Causal
persistence is closely related to Heckerman and
Shachter’s (1995) concept of unresponsiveness. The
latter notion, however, pertains to transitions from
some state of the world to a counterfactual state of
the world, whereas causal persistence pertains to tran-
sitions between real states of the world at different
times. The notion of causal persistence (although not
in this terminology) is discussed in Heckerman et al.
(1994). Related notions are discussed in Pearl (1993),
Goldszmidt and Darwiche (1994), and Balke and Pearl
(1994).
In general, suppose we have a Bayesian network for
a set of domain variables U = {x1, . . . , xn}. Further,
suppose that we want to answer questions of the form:
“What would be the probability of X ⊆ U if we were to
take some action, given that we now observe Y ⊆ U .”
To answer such questions, we construct a new Bayesian
network as we did in our example. First, we copy
the network, using the first and second instances of
the network to represent the domain variables before
and after we take the action. Second, we introduce
mapping nodes mi for each domain node xi, and as-
sess the prior probabilities of these nodes. Typically,
these mapping nodes will be mutually independent,
but they need not be [Heckerman and Shachter, 1995].
Also, note that if xi is a root node, then mi = xi and
we do not need to explicitly create the mapping node.
Third, we make both versions of node xi the same
deterministic function of its parents and mi. Finally,
we identify those domain nodes in the post-action net-
work that are affected directly by our action, break
the arcs from their parents, and set the states of these
nodes to their values as determined by our action.3
Under this construction, as in our example, the shared
mapping nodes encode causal persistence. We refer to
Bayesian networks constructed in this manner as per-
sistence networks.
2.2 Single-Copy Approximation: Repair
Although a persistence network is a correct represen-
tation of the effects of actions, we are still left with
the problem that a persistence network often contains
many undirected cycles, making inference computa-
tionally expensive. In this section, we describe an ap-
proximation wherein the repair probabilities can be
computed without copying the original Bayesian net-
work. This approximation relies on representing the
behavior of the device using a form of causal indepen-
dence (see, e.g., Srinivas [1993] and Heckerman and
Breese [1996]).
The notion of causal independence is illustrated in Fig-
ure 3. The effect of set of causes c1, . . . , cn on an effect
3In doing so, we assume that the direct effects of
actions are deterministic. The more general case can
be handled with influence diagrams in canonical form
[Heckerman and Shachter, 1995].
Table 1: The four possible mappings between “Net” and “Icon”.
ok stuck on grey stuck on normal backwards
Net abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal
Icon grey normal grey grey normal normal normal grey
e
.....
f
c1
e'1
c2
e'2
c
n
e'
n
Figure 3: A Bayesian network for the interaction be-
tween a set of causes and an effect under causal inde-
pendence.
e are modeled in terms of a set of mediator variables
e′
1
, . . . , e′n and a function f(e
′
1
, . . . , e′n). The mediator
variables are dependent on their associated causes ci,
and serve as inputs to the function f . The choice of f is
arbitrary, in general, though in many applications it is
an or relationship, where the effect is abnormal if any
of the causal inputs is abnormal. Typically, we also
designate one of the causal inputs as a “leak” cause
that is always set to its abnormal state. Note that, for
purposes of troubleshooting as described in Section 2,
the leak causes are summarized as a single “all other”
fault that can be repaired at a fixed cost with a service
call, as discussed in [Heckerman et al., 1995].
Suppose our device satisfies the following conditions:
(1) the interaction between the n components of the
device c1, . . . , cn and the output of the device e satisfy
causal independence, and (2) the function f has the
property that the output is normal if all inputs are
normal. For example, the noisy-or relationship and
the noisy-adder relationship (with 0 corresponding to
Normal) satisfy these conditions. If we impose these
restrictions, and we assume there is a single component
that is faulty, Heckerman et al. (1994) show that
Pr(epost = Normal|Repair(ci), epre = Abnormal, I)
= Pr(e′i,pre = Abnormal|epre = Abnormal, I)
That is, the probability that the effect is normal after
the repair is equal to the probability that the associ-
ated mediator node is abnormal in the original net-
work. For many troubleshooting domains, we have
used the right-hand-side of Equation 1 in place of
the left-hand-side as an approximation, because the
right-hand-side may be computed without copying the
Bayesian network for a device. Given the observation
that e is abnormal, the single-fault assumption is likely
to be true, because it is unlikely that two components
of a device will fail at the same time. We rescale the
probabilities for the nodes e′i, so that the sum over the
probabilities of all non-normal states of all nodes e′i is
equal to one.
2.3 Nonbase Observations
In Section 2, we considered two special classes of ob-
servations: (1) the observation of the problem-defining
variable after a repair is made, and (2) the observation
of a component before a repair is made (as part of an
observation-repair action). We refer to these obser-
vations as base observations. In many situations, we
want to be able to make more general observations.
For example, when our car fails to start, we may want
to check the radio or the headlights in order to check
the status of the electrical system. In this section, we
describe a method for making such general observa-
tions.
Let us suppose we have m nonbase observations
o1, o2, . . . , om available to us. We assume that obser-
vation oi can take on exactly one of ri possible states.
We write oi = k to indicate that observation oi takes
on state k. First, we use the procedures described in
Sections 2 to generate a troubleshooting sequence con-
sisting of only base observations and repairs. Second,
we imagine that we make observation oi first, and then
determine the sequence. The expected cost of observ-
ing oi with information I, denoted ECO(I, oi), consists
of an observation cost plus the expected cost of a set
of conditional plans as given by
ECO(I, oi) =
Coi +
ri∑
k=1
Pr(oi = k|I) ECR(I ∪ {oi = k}) (1)
Note that the troubleshooting sequence following the
observation may be different for every possible out-
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Figure 4: A Bayesian network for a simple configura-
tion scenario.
come of the observation. Finally, we repeat the com-
putation of ECO for every possible nonbase observa-
tion.
3 Changing the Configuration
An expert troubleshooter will often change the setup
or configuration of a device and observe the new be-
havior of the device to infer the underlying problem(s)
with the device. In this section we provide a deci-
sion theoretic account of this type of troubleshooting,
and show how it can be implemented using Bayesian
networks and the troubleshooting framework we have
described above.
A Bayesian network for a canonical configurable device
is shown in Figure 4. The device works with either the
P1 process or the P2 process. The node Config corre-
sponds to an action that determines the configuration
of the device. The node Switch takes on the value of
P1 if Config is set to 1 and the value of P2 if Config
is set to 2. The overall behavior of the device, cap-
tured in the problem defining node (PD), depends on
Switch and two additional subcomponents, C5 and C6.
By setting the configuration node to one value or the
other, we isolate part of the system for inspection.
To further motivate the scenario, consider a failure in
printing from your PC to a network printer. In gen-
eral, the problem could be local to your PC or some-
where in the network. We can try to print locally. If
this action succeeds, then it rules out a host of prob-
lems associated with the local configuration. If this
action fails, it will increase the probability of a local
malfunction. Though changing configuration appears
to be most compelling in troubleshooting hardware or
other man-made devices, the notion is also relevant
for medical diagnosis. For example, a physician diag-
nosing headaches may ask a patient to change diet or
work habits to rule out various allergy or stress related
disorders.
To incorporate this type of reasoning into our frame-
work, we need two elements. First, we need to cal-
culate the updated fault probabilities, given we set a
configuration parameter and then make an observa-
tion. Because we are combining information from two
situations—the first with the configuration parameter
set in its original position and the second after the
change—we will use a persistence network. Second,
we need to use these updated fault probabilities to es-
timate the expected cost of a plan that starts with a
configuration change. We will describe the cost esti-
mation framework first, and then discuss calculation
of the necessary probabilities.
Our framework is as follows. In most cases, a configu-
ration node can be treated like any other non-base ob-
servation (see Section 2.3) in that we may recommend
that the current state be observed without necessarily
setting it to another state. In addition, we allow the
following new alternative: (1) set configuration node c
to some value m, (2) make a non-base observation oi,
(3) change the configuration back to its original state,
and (4) undertake a sequence of repairs. The analysis
of this new alternative is similar to that described in
Section 2.3. The expected cost of repair for setting
configuration node c to state m followed by observing
node oi is given by
ECCO(I, oi, c = m) = C
s + Coi +
ri∑
k=1
Pr(oi,post = k|cpost = m, Ipre)
ECR(Ipre ∪ {oi,post = k} ∪ {cpost = m}) (2)
where Cs is the cost of changing the configuration from
its current state to a new state and back. In the course
of troubleshooting, we evaluate this expression for each
possible configuration–observation pair,4 and recom-
mend that configuration–observation pair that has the
lowest expected cost.
3.1 Calculating Probabilities after a
Configuration Change
As mentioned, we need to calculate the probability of
the faults given we have set a configuration variable
to some value and then made some observation. We
use a persistence network to perform this computa-
tion. As discussed in Section 2.2, we will again rely
4The observation can be restricted to the problem defin-
ing node, if desired.
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Figure 5: A Bayesian network for a simple configura-
tion scenario, expanded to expose its causal indepen-
dence representation.
on causal independence as a representation of the de-
vice’s operation. Here the motivation is not to allow
a single-copy approximation, but to reduce the state
space of the mapping nodes needed in the persistence
network. Causal independence imposes a special struc-
ture on the mapping nodes associated with an effect
node. Specifically, there is a single mapping node as-
sociated with each cause to mediator link and these
mapping nodes are mutually independent.
The first step is to convert the original Bayesian net-
work into a causal-independence representation with
mediator nodes. This conversion was applied to the
network of Figure 4 and is shown in Figure 5. We
then create mapping nodes for each non-root non-
deterministic domain variable as shown in the upper
left-hand-corner of Figure 6. We then copy all nodes in
the original network—except the component nodes—
and include a new node that represents the configu-
ration after the change. We do not copy the com-
ponent nodes, because we assume their states persist
after the configuration change. The result is shown
in Figure 6. Finally, we copy the parent-structure and
probability/function tables of the copied nodes to their
corresponding copies.
The network in Figure 6 is used to evaluate the prob-
abilities used in Equation 2. We retain all current
observations in the original (upper left) portion of the
network, presumably including the fact that the prob-
lem defining node is abnormal. We set the configura-
tion node in the “post” network to a possible value,
and perform probabilistic inference using the network
to obtain Pr(oi,post = k|cj,post = m, Ipre) for each pos-
sible observation oi,post = k. We then compute the
fault probabilities of the components for every possi-
ble non-base observation. We use these probabilities
to calculate the various repair sequences and associ-
ated expected costs of repair as described previously.
Finally, we repeat this entire set of computations for
every possible state of the configuration node other
than its current state. Note that if there are multi-
ple configuration nodes and we hypothetically set the
value of one configuration node, the value of the other
configuration nodes must remain the same from the
“pre” to “post” network, even if we do not know their
values.
3.2 Single-Copy Approximation:
Configuration
An approximation can be undertaken to avoid the use
of the persistence network for the computation of the
fault probabilities. First, we set the configuration node
to some value and remove any down stream evidence in
the original network. Next, for each possible non-base
observation, we note which fault probabilities go to
zero or one. Finally, we generate repair plans, clamp-
ing those logically determined component nodes to
their respective values and retaining the original fault
probabilities for the remaining component nodes.
4 Summary of the Troubleshooting
Decision Making
In the course of executing this plan, we generate many
complete repair plans, but at each stage we only ex-
ecute the first step of one of the plans. Thus, our
approximate decision-theoretic method for generating
a troubleshooting sequence can be summarized as fol-
lows. First, we evaluate ECR(I)—the expected cost of
repair under our current state of information I. Also,
for every observation oi, the expected cost of its obser-
vation ECO(I, oi) is calculated. Also, for every com-
bination of configuration setting and observation, we
calculate ECCO(I, oi, c = m). Next, we recommend
that repair, observation, or configuration–observation
that has the lowest expected cost. If ECR(I) has the
lowest value, then we repair c1, check if the device is
functioning properly, and quit if so. If an observation
or configuration–observation has the lowest expected
value, we make that observation. Finally, we update
probabilities in the network, based on the new infor-
mation from the observation or the repair, and iterate
this procedure.
Although we evaluate the expected cost of the next
step by assuming that a non-base observation or
configuration–observation will be followed by a pure
repair sequence, in the actual running of the algorithm,
observation and configuration–observations can be in-
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Figure 6: A persistence network for a simple configuration scenario.
terleaved with the repair sequence. Similarly, although
the cost-estimation step assumes a single fault, the al-
gorithm will run (albeit approximately) for a device
with multiple faults.
5 Example
We have applied the general approach to troubleshoot-
ing printing problems, automobile startup problems,
copier feeder systems, and gas turbines. A model
addressing Microsoft Windows 95 printing problems,
without the procedure for suggesting configuration
changes described in Section 3, was implemented and
delivered as part of the Microsoft Windows 95 Product
Support Services Resource Kit. This system has been
well received and additional troubleshooters based on
this approach are in development.
An example of the type of steps generated by the
troubleshooter follows. For the printer network, trou-
bleshooting begins by observing the Print Output node
in its abnormal state. A pure repair sequence—that
is with no nonbase observations—starts with verifying
that the network printer is on and online and has an
expected cost of 13.62 minutes. The best nonbase ob-
servation is determination of the printer location, fol-
lowed by a repair sequence, with a total expected cost
of 13.71 minutes. The best configuration-observation
option is to print locally and see if you get output.
With probability 0.42 there is output and the expected
cost of repair at that point is 7.07 minutes, with a se-
quence starting with verifying the net printer is online.
Under this scenario, we have generally ruled out any
problems with the computer itself. If local printing
fails, (probability is 0.58), then a print driver problem
(or some other local problem) is indicated and the ex-
pected cost of repair is 13.83 minutes. The expected
cost of the configuration-observation plan is 10.98 min-
utes, plus 2 minutes for setting (and resetting) the con-
figuration for a total of 12.98 minutes, the best option
at this stage.
In terms of computational overhead, the primary fac-
tors are the increased size of the persistence network
relative to the original network and additional infer-
ence steps needed for configuration recommendations.
For the printing problems network (Figure 1) and the
configuration network (Figure 4), the size of the join
tree inference representation and propagation times for
the persistence networks were roughly twice that for
the standard single copy versions. We need a num-
ber of additional inference cycles equal to the product
of the number of individual configuration settings and
the number of individual observation values. The fac-
tors have not been significant in the examples we have
run to date.
6 Empirical Results
In previous work [Heckerman et al., 1995], we devel-
oped a Monte-Carlo technique for estimating trou-
bleshooting costs for a given planner and domain. We
used a Bayesian network for a given device to generate
a relatively large set of problem instances where one
or more faults are known to have occurred. This study
showed that the decision-theoretic troubleshooter had
lower expected costs of repair than a static cost–based
procedure, and also performed well in situations where
there were multiple faults.
We performed a similar simulation study to verify
the performance of the configuration planner versus
a planner that did not suggest configuration changes.
We applied each algorithm to the printing network
shown in Figure 1. The planner that suggested config-
uration changes had an average time to resolution of
13.4 minutes, while the average time to repair for the
planner that did not suggest configuration changes was
14.4 minutes. Of course, the magnitude of savings in a
particular application depend on the cost and proba-
bilities in that domain. For a domain such as printing
problems where are there are millions of incidents per
year, even the modest savings estimated here can re-
sult in a substantial total time or dollar savings.
7 Summary
We have developed a system for decision-theoretic
troubleshooting where in a system can choose among
several classes of possible actions—repairing a compo-
nent, making a passive observation, or changing the
configuration of the device and making an observa-
tion. We have developed approximations in the con-
text of a myopic cycle for determining the best course
of action. An important component of this work has
been to show how to use the concept of persistence to
compute the probabilities of events after repairs and
configuration changes have been made.
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